The Service Game is a model for reciprocity in multiagent systems. Here, agents interact repeatedly by requesting and providing services. In contrast to existing models where players are matched randomly, players of the Service Game may choose with whom they play. The rationale behind provider selection is to choose a provider that is likely to perform a task as desired. We develop a formal model for provider selection in the Service Game. An evolutionary process based on a genetic algorithm allows us to incorporate notions of bounded rationality, learning, and adaptation into the analysis of the game. We conduct a series of experiments to study the evolution of strategies and the emergence of cooperation. We show that cooperation is more expensive with provider selection than with random matching. Further, populations consisting of discriminators and defectors form a bistable community.
Cooperation through Reciprocity in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Analysis
Christian Hütter and Klemens Böhm
10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011)
|Datum:||May 2-6, 2011|